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OFF-RESERVATION HUNTING AND FISHING
RIGHTS: SCALES TIP IN FAVOR OF
STATES AND SPORTSMEN?
JERRY

L. BEAN*

Numerous other court battles are now being fought by Indians in an attempt to uphold their traditional hunting and
fishing rights. At stake is not only a property right and
sometimes a treaty right, but a cultural and psychological
support as well. Hunting, fishing, and trapping have always
loomed large in Indian culture, even among those tribes
whose primary subsistence has derived from agriculture.1
Interests of states in conservation, recreation, and revenue invariably clash with the hunting and fishing rights of Native Americans. Efforts to restrict the Native American game harvest will
likely intensify as population pressures increase the competition for
wildlife resources. This will confound the scope of rights which have
been the object of controversy since the nineteenth century. 2 Even
the United States Supreme Court has failed to alleviate the confusion which shrouds Native American game rights.3 Indeed, recently the Court again neglected to offer any helpful guidance to lower
courts in balancing the treaty rights of Indians against the sports
privileges of non-Indians. 4
This article explores off-reservation hunting and fishing rights
5
with emphasis on the need for judicial analysis and guidance.
The first part of the discussion reviews applicable decisional law.
* Private practice, Cortez, Colorado; J.D. 1972, University of Kansas.
1. W. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND--WHITE MAN'S LAw, 196 (1971).
2. Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504' (1896).
3. See Johnson, The States Versus Indian Off-Reservation Flshing: A United States Supreme Court Error, 47 WASH. L. REv. 207 (1972).
4. Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 414 U.S. 44 (1973).
5. The case law has met with critical discussion, see Johnson, The States Versus Indian
Off-Reservation Fishing: A United States Supreme Court Error, 47 WASH. L. REv. 207
(1972) ; Burnett, Indian Hunting, Fishing and Trapping Rights: The Record and the Controversy, 7 IDAHo L. Rzv. 49 (1970); Hobbs, Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights I1. 37
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1251 (1968) ; Hobbs, Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights, 32 GEO.
WASH. L. Pxv. 504 (1964) ; Note, State Power and the Indian Treaty Rights to Fish, 59
CALw. L. REv. 485 (1971); Note, 48 N.D. L. REv. 729 (1972) ; Comment, 43 WASH. L.
REv. 670 (1968) ; Comment, 10 AIz. L. REv. 725 (1968).
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I.

NEARLY A CENTURY OF CONFUSION
No treaty or law of general application governs the hunting and fishing rights of all Indians. Some tribes, in their
treaties with the United States, reserved the right to hunt
and fish on their own reservations or at "usual and accustomed" places or on "open and unclaimed" lands of the
United States away from the reservations. In the absence of
these provisions, the general rule is that Indians who hunt
or fish away from their reservations are like non-Indians,
subject to the laws of the State.8

A.

SUPREME COURT VACILLATIONS

-

A DEARTH OF ANALYSIS AND GUIDANCE
[N]o one knows the law about any case or with respect to any given situation, transaction, or event, until there
has been a specific decision with regard thereto.7
In Ward v. Race Horse," the United States Supreme Court first
considered a conflict involving a Native American hunting pursuant
to treaty, but in violation of state law. Race Horse, a Bannock residing upon the Fort Hall reservation in Idaho, was arrested in
the adjacent state of Wyoming for killing seven elk 100 miles from
his reservation on unoccupied public land.'10 Race Horse argued that
he was immune from all state hunting laws because of a provision
in a treaty" made by the United States with the Eastern Band of
Shoshonees and the Bannock Tribe of Indians. In part, the treaty
provided as follows:
The Indians herein named . . .shall have the right to hunt
upon the unoccupied lands of the United States so long as
game may be found thereon, and so long as peace subsists
among the whites
and Indians on the borders of the hunt2
ing districts.1
The State of Wyoming countered that its -hunting laws applied
to Race Horse because the Enabling Act's which authorized its admission to the Union stated that entry was to be "on equal footing
with the original states in all respects whatsoever,' '14 and this Act
6. Dep't of Interior, 10 (1970), ANSWERS TO YoUR QUESTiONS ABOUT AMERIcAN INDIL&NS.
7. Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 17, 41 (1931).
8. 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
9. He was charged with killing the animals out of season, exceeding the bag limit, and
failing to possess a Wyoming hunting license.
10. In re Race Norse, 70 Fed. 598, 600 (C.C.D. Wyo. 1895), re,9d 163 U.S. 504 (1895).
11.
12.
13.
14.

15 Stat. 673 (1868).
Id. at 674-75.
26 Stat. 222 (1890).
Id. This language iscommonly referred to as the "equal footing doctrine."
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did not expressly except or reserve hunting rights for Indians.1 5
Therefore, the State contended, the Act gave it "the police power of
the original states to regulate the taking and killing of game and
fish." 1 6 Accordingly, the State claimed that:
possession of this police power in the new state upon its admission was inconsistent with . . . any restrictive right in
the Indians, or any other persons, to hunt or fish within the
state, and therefore necessarily repealed or abrogated any
treaty or congressional enactment upon this subject."7
The federal district court rejected the State's argument of implicit repeal of hunting rights. 18 The court stated:
[I]t is not difficult to understand how they would consider this right or privilege to hunt of supreme importance
to them, and why, in negotiating a treaty, they would insist
that this right be recognized and guaranteed to them. 19
The lower court reasoned that since the Enabling Act did not expressly abrogate the treaty, 20 and since the Constitution gave exclusive power to the federal government to regulate intercourse with
Indians,2 1 it cannot be argued that the Act implicitly repeals treaty
22
rights.
The United States Supreme Court reversed in what the lone dissent characterized as an opinion that sanctioned a repudiation of
the treaty. 23 The majority, through Justice White, focused upon the
words "unoccupied lands" and decreed that only upon those lands
which would remain unoccupied were hunting rights granted. 2' The
Court thereby divined that the hunting rights were only "temporary
and precarious"2 5 because the burden (of hunting and fishing rights
for aborigines) imposed upon the territory was "essentially perish26
able and intended to be of limited duration."
Although the Court emphasized what it described as the "situation existing at the time, ' 27 no appreciation for the Indian understanding of the terms of the treaty was evident. Nor was weight
15. In re Race Horse, 70 Fed. 598, 600 (C.C.D. Wyo. 1895). Interestingly, an act which
established the territory of Wyoming did make such an exception. Ward v. Race Horse,
163 U.S. 504, 506.
16. 70 Fed. at 609.
17.

Id.

18.

Id. at 618.

19.

Id.

20.
21.
22.
28.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
70 Fed. at 613.
Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 516 (1896)
Id. at 508 (Opinion of the Court).
Id. at 510.
Id. at 515.
Id. at 508.

at 608.

(Brown, J., dissenting).
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given to the trial court's findings of fact as to Indian understanding,
minutes of treaty negotiations which preceeded the treaty signing,
or the legislative history that accompanied the ratification of the
treaty. In addition, no effort was made to distinguish Geer v. Connecticut 2s decided a few months earlier when Justice White defined

the scope of state power over game as qualified by rights conveyed
to the federal government by the Constitution. Justice Brown, dissenting, accurately observed that the majority's holding meant that
the admission of Wyoming as a state abrogated the Indian rights
pro tanto, and put the power of Indians to hunt completely at the
29
mercy of the state.

Indian intention at the time of the treaty became important
nine years later in United States v. Winans. 80 At issue was whether
a treaty section reserved to the Indians a right-of-way across privately-owned land in the enjoyment of their reserved right to fish
at "usual and accustomed places'" In a marked departure from
Race Horse, albeit sub silentio, the Supreme Court concluded as follows:
At the time the [Yakima] treaty was made the fishing
places were part of the Indian country, subject to the occupancy of the Indians, with all the rights such occupancy
gave.
The remarks of the [trial] court stated the issue and the
ground of decision. The contention of the respondents was
sustained. In other words, it was decided that the Indians
acquired no rights but what any inhabitant of the Territory
or State would have. .

.

. This is certainly an impotent out-

come to negotiations and a convention, which seemed to
promise more and give the word of the Nation for more. And
we have said we will construe a treaty with the Indians as
"that unlettered people" understood it, and "as justice and
reason demand in cases where power is exerted by the
strong over those to whom they owe care and protection,"
and counterpoise the inequality "by superior justice which
looks only to the substance of the right without regard to the
technical rules." . . . How the treaty in question was under-

stood may be gathered from the circumstances.
The right to resort to the fishing places in controversy
was part of larger rights possessed by the Indians, upon the
exercise of which there was not a shadow of impediment,
and which was not much less necessary to the existence of
the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed. New condi28. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
29. 163 U.S. at 518.
30. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). Private land owners in the state of
Washington had attempted to restrict the off-reservation commercial fishing activities of
the Yakimas.
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tions came into existence, to which those rights had to be
accommodated. Only a limitation of them, however, was necessary and intended, not a taking away. In other words, the
treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant
of rights from them-a reservation of those not granted.3 1
The Court held that that treaty reserved a perpetual right-ofway to cross and use privately owned land in the enjoyment of the
Yakimas' reserved right to fish. 32 The Court apparently abandoned
the "equal footing" analysis used in Race Horse, and instead shifted to a "reserved rights" doctrine.
Eleven years later in State of New York ex rel. Kennedy v.
Becker,33 the Court again had occasion to pass upon state game
laws that were in apparent conflict with treaty provisions. There,
too, state game laws were held to apply to the Native Americans
34
in spite of an express treaty provision to the contrary. Three
Seneca Indians were charged with violation of a New York conservation law when they were caught spearing fish off the Cattaraugus
reservation. 5 They raised the treaty issue in a habeas corpus proceeding. The state court released them. The state appellate court
reversed. It entertained the federal question and decided that state
36
law controlled and remanded the Senecas to custody. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed. It postulated that the right to fish
37
was not an exclusive right, and that there could not exist a duality of sovereignty within the state so the tribal rights should not
38
be construed to derogate the state's authority. The Court arrogantly concluded that because conditions of today could not have been
9
anticipated or understood at the time the treaty was made, the
treaty conveyed only a privilege to be shared in common with the
grantees of the land and others subject to appropriate state regula40
tion.
In 1942 the Supreme Court reviewed another attempt by the
State of Washington to wrest fishing rights from the Yakimas. In
Tuee v. Washington,4 1 a Yakima tribal member was charged in
state court with having "caught food fish . . . and with selling
commercially the fish which he had caught, all without first having
81. Id. at 379, 380 (footnotes omitted).
32. The decision's emphasis on reserved rights in the above quoted passage is referred
to as the Winans' reserved doctrine.
38. 241 U.S. 556 (1916).
34. The Treaty of the Big Tree stated, in part, as follows: "[a]lso, excepting and reserving to them, the said parties of the first part and their heirs, the privilege of fishing
and hunting on the said tract of land hereby intended to be conveyed." 7 Stat. 601 (1797).
35. 241 U.S. at 559.
36. Id. at 560.
37. Id. at 562.
88. Id. at 563.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 563-64.
41. 315 U.S. 681 (1942).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

obtained a (state) license to fish .... -42 The alleged violations took

place at a traditional fishing site of the Yakimas within the boundaries of the original reservation. The Yakimas later ceded the land
to the federal government. The question was whether the members
of the Confederated Yakima Nation could fish at traditional sites
within the territory ceded outside of their reservation, and sell their
catch commercially as a principal means of livelihood, without having first secured a license from the State of Washington.43
Sampson Tulee relied on an 1855 treaty as his defense.4 4 In part
it provided as follows:
The exclusive right of taking fish in all the streams,
where running through or bordering said reservation, is further secured to said confederated tribes and bands of Indians, as also the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed
places, in common with the citizens of the Ter45
ritory.
The State of Washington responded that the treaty language should
not be construed to impair its "broad powers to conserve game and
fish within its borders.

14

6

Besides, the State asserted,

"since

its

license laws do not discriminate against the Indians, they do not
7
conflict with the treaty.'4

In a strongly-worded unanimous opinion by Mr. Justice Black,
the Supreme Court rejected the state's arguments as follows:
In determining the scope of the reserved rights of . . . fish-

ing, we must not give the treaty the narrowest construction
it will bear. In U. S. v. Winans .

.

.,

this Court held that,

despite the phrase "in common with the citizens of the Territory," Article III conferred upon the Yakimas continuing
rights, beyond those which other citizens may enjoy, to fish
at their "usual and accustomed places" in the ceded areas;
....

From the ...

proceedings in the long council at which

the treaty agreement was reached, we are impressed by the
strong desire the Indians had to retain the right to hunt and
fish in accordance with the immemorial customs of their
tribes. It is our responsibility to see that the terms of the
treaty are carried out, so far as possible, in accordance with
the meaning they were understood to have by the tribal representatives at the council, and in a spirit which generously
recognizes the full obligation of
this nation to protect the in48
terests of a dependent people.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

State v. Tulee, 7 Wash. 2d 124, 109 P.2d 280 (1941).
315 U.S. at 683.
12 Stat. 951 (1859).
Id. at 953.
315 U.S. at 683.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 684-85.
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The application of the "reserved rights" doctrine of the Winans
Case, in Tulee marks the beginning of a consistent judicial posture.
However, Tulee continued the dictum from Winans49 that
the treaty leaves the state with the power to impose on Indians, equally with others, such restrictions of a purely regulatory nature concerning the time and' manner of fishing
outside the reservation as are necessary for the conservaion of fishA0
In so stating, Justice Black posited a "reasonable and necessary" qualifications on the "reserved right" doctrine the extent of
which remains less than lucid today.5 1 In deciding Tulee, the "equal
footing" repeal by implication doctrine of Race Horse 52 was ignored.
Otherwise, Tulee should have held that the admission of Washington
to Statehood without express reservation of Indian off-reservation
hunting and fishing rights impliedly subjected Sampson Tulee to the
state game laws. Instead of discussing Congressional intent as did
Race Horse the Court focused on the strong Indian intent. The latter
is more consistent with the reasoning of the federal trial court in
53
Race Horse.
After Tulee's dictum, allowing regulation for conservation, the
Supreme Court next proclaimed that it "saw no reason" why the
states could not regulate the off-reservation fishing of Indians.5 4 In
Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game,55 the United States Supreme
Court was asked to decide whether the State of Washington could
prohibit set net and drift net fishing on the Puyallup and Nisqually
Rivers outside the reservations. The Puyallup and Nisqually Indians
claimed immunity from state regulations by virtue of the following
treaty language:
The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds
and stations, is further secured to said Indians, in common
with all citizens of the territory, and of erecting temporary
houses for the purpose of curing, together with the privilege
of hunting, gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their
horses on open and unclaimed lands: Provided, however,
That they shall not take shell fish from any beds staked or
cultivated by citizens, and that they shall alter all stallions
not intended for breeding horses, and shall keep up and confine the latter. 5
49.

50.
51.

1255
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

198 U.S. at 384.

315 U.S. at 684.
See, e.g., Hobbs, Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights II, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1251,
n.26 (1968).
See text accompanying note 14, supra.
In re Race Horse, 70 Fed. 598, 613 (C.C.D. Wyo. 1895) rev'd 163 U.S. 504 (1895).
Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968).
Id.
10 Stat. 1133 (1855).
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Relying on the Tulee dictum, the State of Washington urged that the
regulations were "necessary for conservation of the fish"
In a terse opinion Justice Douglas stated, in part, for a unanimous court:

..

The treaty right is in terms of the right to fish "at all usual
and accustomed places." We assume that fishing by nets was
customary at the time of the Treaty; and we also assume
that there were commercial aspects to that fishing as there
are at present. But the manner in which the fishing may be
done and its purpose, whether or not commercial, are not
mentioned in the Treaty. We would have quite a different
case if the Treaty had preserved the right to fish at the
"usual and accustomed places" in the "usual and accustomed" manner. But the Treaty is silent as to the mode or
modes of fishing that are guaranteed. Moreover, the right
to fish at those respective places is not an exclusive one.
Rather, it is one "in common with all citizens of the Territory." Certainly the right of the latter may be regulated. And
- we see no reason why the right of the Indians might not also
be regulated by an appropriate exercise of the police power of
the State. The right to fish "at all usual and accustomed"
places may, of course, not be qualified by the State, even
though all Indians born in the United States are now citizens
of the United States ....
But the manner of fishing, the size
of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and the
like may be regulated by the State in the interest of conservation, provided the regulation meets appropriate standards
and does not discriminate against the Indians. 57

The Puyallup decision opens the door for states to regulate Indian
off-reservation hunting or fishing. 8 Puyallup is subject to criticism
in that the Court failed to give any reason for its assumption that
Indian treaty rights are subject to state regulation.5 9 At a minimum,
the Court should have acknowledged that it was overruling Missouri
v. Holland0 which established the supremacy of treaties over
57.

391 U.S. at 399.

58. The Court, quoting Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 685 (1942), held that a license fee "acts upon the Indians as a charge for exercising the very right their ancestors
intended to reserve." Id. at 402.
59. See Johnson, The States Versus Indian Off-Reservation Fishing, 47 WASH. L. Rv.
207 (1972); Hobbs, Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights 11, 37 GEO. WASH. L.
1259-61 (1968).

REv.

1251,

60. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). The United States and Great Britain entered into a treaty in 1916 for the protection and management of migratory waterfowl.
The federal statute implementing the treaty was attacked by the State of Missouri. The
Supreme Court held that the treaty overrode state law.
61.

"Lacking the constitutional power to make treaties of any kind, the courts
are equally without power to rewrite them from time to time or at alleven to achieve what the courts believe to be a good result. The judicial
function is limited, I think, to enforcing and upholdng the treaties according

to their content and spirit."
Department of Games v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 80 Wash. 2d 256, 497 P.2d 171, 181 (1972),
rev'd 414 U.S. 44 (1979)

(Hale, J., dissenting).
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states.

1

A corresponding exception to Article VI of the United States

Constitution which places treaties on a par with the Constitution
as "the supreme Law of the Land," ' 62 needs adequate explanation.
Fairness demands that treaty rights be above state regulation unless
and until Congress abrogates 3 the treaty and pays due compensation for the rights.64
After Puyallup, lower courts were left to define "reasonable
and necessary" conservation measures without guidance from the
Supreme Court. When Puyallup was remanded', the Washington Supreme Court faced just this task.6 5 The principal issue was whether
a Department of Game regulation which forbade all commercial

fishing of steelhead was reasonable and necessary for the preservation of the fishery. The Washington Supreme Court concluded as
follows:
The state has clearly met that test, at least to the extent
that it has established that the continued use by defendants
of their drift nets and set nets would result in the nearly complete destruction of the anadromous fish (steelheads) runs in
the Puyallup River and that a regulation prohibiting the use of
66

such nets was necessary for the preservation of the fishery.

After being reversed by the United States Supreme Court it is
understandable that the state court would carefully reason its decision. Predictably there was extensive reliance upon expert testimony to ascertain the "reasonableness and necessity" of the conservation regulations. From an initial definition of conservation, 67
the court scrutinized the regulations to see if a total ban of commer-

cial steelhead fishing was necessary. The court held that:
as a guideline in an allowable Indian gill net fishery for the
lawful catching of one species of fish is not permissible in the

event there is a substantial number of protected species

caught that are within the number required for spawning
62.

"Constitution . . . of the United States . . . and all treaties made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
U.S. CONST. art. VI, part 2.
63. Compare Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) with Menominee v. United
States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
64. A student writer concludes that Menominee v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968)
may subject Congress to a claim for damages when states restrict Indian tr'eaty hunting
and fishing rights pursuant to Puyallup. Note, Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights, 10 ARiz.
L. Rsv. 725 (1968). See Whitefoot v. United States, 293 F.2d 658 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 818 (1962).
65. Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 80 Wash. 2d 561, 497 P.2d 171 (1972),
rev'd 414 U.S. 44 (1973).
66. Id. at , 497.
67. "[I]t is wise use. When we put it In terms of salmon harvest, I would put
it in three categories or three parts, by harvest, in management of salmon
as a crop, one, there must be a surplus and over and above the needed spawning escapement to have an available crop and not be taking the food stock.
Two, the manner of fishing, itself, must be such that you can control it so
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escapement and hatchery needs, necessary for conservation
of that species. 6
From this premise, the court found that Indian net fishery for
steelhead "would have been destructive to the conservation of the
steelhead fishery." 69 It also held that new fishing regulations for
the Tribe must be made each year, supported by facts and data
to show that the regulation is necessary for state conservation.
The two dissenting judges would have found that since the Puyallup Tribe allegedly had ceased to exist as a tribal entity, that
descendants of the tribal members would have no fishing rights
except those held in common with non-Indians. 71 Such a position
is untenable after Menominee Tribe v. United States.7 2 There a
federally-terminated tribe with no express treaty right to game was
found to have the rights to hunt and fish by implication from other
treaty language.7 8 The United States Supreme Court did not consider
this argument, however, upon granting certiori to the Puyallups.
The United States Supreme Court in an opinion written by Justice
Douglas consumed little space in reversing the lengthy Washington
state decision.7 4 The issue was whether the ban on all net fishing
in the Puyallup River for steelhead amounts to discrimination under
the treaty.7 5 The Court initially observed that the "ban on all net
fishing in the Puyallup River for steelhead grants in effect the
entire run to the sports fishermen. ' '7 6 It held that the ban is discriminatory "because all Indian net fishing is barred and only hook
77
and line fishing, entirely pre-empted by non-Indians, is allowed."
Although the Court aptly noted that "the aim" must be to "accommodate the rights of Indians under the Treaty and the rights
of other people, '7 8 it refused to offer any guidelines to lower courts
in this apportionment process. Instead, the Court reserved judgment
on a percentage basis for allocating the catch based on native
versus hatchery planted fish.7 9 The Court had before it facts that
indicated that the catch of hatchery-raised steelhead had been 60
per cent one year and 80 per cent another.80 Since 80 per cent
that you do not dip into the seed stock. . . . The other thing is that the
manner of fishing, itself, must not be destructive."
Id. at -,
497 P.2d at 177.
68. Id. at 497 P.2d at 177-78.
69. Id. at -,
497 P.2d at 178.
70.

Id.

71.

Id. at

72.

391 U.S. 404

73.

Id. at 409 n.10; see also Elser v. Gill Net No. One, 246 Cal. App. 2d 80, 54 Cal. Rptr.

-,

497 P.2d at 187.
(1968).

568 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).

74. Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 414 U.S. 44 (1973).
75. Id. at 47.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

80.

Id.

at 48.
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of the cost of the hatchery program was borne by sports fishermen
license fees,"' it could be argued that the sports fishermen should
be permitted to harvest that percentage of stocked fish.8 2
Nevertheless, Puyallup II did focus upon some of the variables
that would have to be considered in arriving at a formula for
allocation. These included the number of nets, the number of steelhead that can be caught with nets, the places where nets can
be placed, the length of the net season, the frequency during the
season when nets may be used, the number of hook and line licenses
issued, catch limits, and the duration of the sports season. 3 Additionally, Puyallup II assured state fish and game departments that
treaty rights would not be allowed to destroy a species of fish
as follows:
We do not imply that these fishing rights persist down to the
very last steelhead in the river. Rights can be controlled by
the need to conserve a species; and the time may come when
the life of a steelhead is so precarious in a particular stream
that all fishing should be banned until the species regains
assurance of survival. The police power of the State is adequate to prevent the steelhead from following the fate of the
passenger pigeon; and the Treaty does not give the Indians
a federal right to pursue the last living steelhead until it enters their nets. 4
Mr. Justice White wrote a concurring opinion in which he was
joined by Chief Justice Berger and Justice Stewart in which he
maintained that the treaty did not "obligate the State of Washington
to subsidize Indian fishery with planted fish paid for by sports
fishermen." 85 This means that a non-depleting portion of the native
run of 5,000 to 6,000 steelhead annually is all to which "the Indian
treaty rights extend," 8 6 according to the concurrors. Such reasoning ignores the fact that there was evidence before the state court
that the federal government subsidizes the hatchery.8 7 So at a minimum the Indians as citizens 8 are additionally entitled to a portion
of those fish raised at federal expense. Subsequent state regulations
should accommodate the Indian commercial netting of steelhead
in a formula which takes into account both the annual native run
and the federally-subsidized hatchery smolt.
81. Id.
82. But see text accompanying notes 87 and 88, infra.
83. 414 U.S. at 49.
84.

Id.

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Department of Games v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., at 80 Wash. 2d 561, 497 P.2d at 171,
178, rev'd 414 U.S. 44 (1973).
88. Congress conferred citizenship upon Indians in 1924, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2) (1970).
Still, several states denied Indians the franchise until 1948. See Olguin & Utton, The In-
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STATE COURT HIGHLIGHTS-REFRESHING ANALYSIS

[T]he broad spectrum of issues addressed . . . (in Indian
off-reservation hunting and fishing rights litigation) necessarily has drawn the analysis rather thin.89
There are a number of state court decisions in the last three
decades which merit study because of the razor-blade sharpness
of the analysis displayed. In 1943 the Idaho Supreme Court unanimously applied Tulee to prevent the imposition of state license
fees upon a Nez Perce tribal member fishing in waters off the
reservation. The site of the alleged violation in State v. McConville9"
was once part of his reservation but the tribe later ceded it to
the federal government. The treaty which conveyed this land reserved fishing rights as follows:
The exclusive right of taking fish in all the streams
whether running through or bordering said reservation... ;
upon open and unclaimed lands; . . .as also the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places in common with
citizens of the Territory .... "I
In addition to being originally within the 1885 treaty reservation,
the stream in which McConville fished was also "one of the places
' '9 2
where the Indians had customarily fished.
The Idaho Supreme Court held that an Indian who fished without
a license pursuant to his treaty rights was immune from state
prosecution. The court boldly and correctly rejected state contentions that the silence of the state's enabling act abrogated the treaty
rights; 93 that the failure of a subsequent allotment act to preserve
the fishing rights relinquished the rights; 94 and that the cession
of lands and subsequent purchase by white settlers was inconsistent
with continued right to fish.99
The McConville reasoning was reaffirmed and lucidly expanded
by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Arthur.9 6 The court held
that a Nez Perce tribal member who hunted under an off-reservation
treaty right was not subject to Idaho state game laws. The court
determined that the hunting right, as expressed in the treaty, exists
dian Rural Poor: Providing Legal Servies In

a Cross-Culturalgetting, 15 RAN. L. REv. 487,

503 (1966) and cases cited therein; Comment, Native Americans and Discrimination in
89. State v. Tinno, 94 Idaho 759, 497 P.2d 1386, 1394 (1972) (McQuade, C. J.,concurring
opinion).
90. 65 Idaho 46, 139 P.2d 485 (1943).
91. 12 Stat. 957 (1859).
92. 65 Idaho -,
139 P.2d at 487.
93. Id. at -,
139 P.2d at 486.
94. Id. at-,
139, P.2d at 487.
95.

Id.

96.

74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 937 (1954).
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"unimpaired by subsequent agreement, treaty, Act of Congress or
the admission of Idaho to statehood .... ,97 The Arthur court stressed
that all signatories intended the treaty hunting right to extend to
such lands as were not settled and occupied by the whites
under possessory rights or patent or otherwise appropriated
to private ownership, and [the treaty] was not intended to
nor did it exclude lands title to which rested in the federal
government, hence the National Forest reserve upon which
the game in question was killed was 'open and unclaimed'
land.""
Besides studying the intent" of the parties, the Arthur court
carefully analyzed all subsequent legislation pertaining to the Indians
and their hunting rights. This analysis unequivocally shatters the
rationale of Race Horse. 00 The Arthur court incisively discerned
that the Idaho enabling act, although silent as to Indians, did not
state "any expressed intention to abrogate or extinguish any of
the provisions of the treaty of 1855 not to relieve the State of
the obligations thereof. The repeal of such provisions by implication
is not favored. . . ."10" The Arthur court next frontally attacked
the Race Horse decision. It was incorrect, the court said, because
"'no resort was had to the minutes made preceding the execution
of the treaty;"' 0 2 the majority considered "the changes and developments which followed (the treaty) rather than the conditions as
they existed at the time;" 0 3 and repeal by implication of the 1855
treaty by the 1890 Enabling Act was inapplicable because the 1893
Nez Perce Agreement expressly recognized the continuation of treaty
rights.10 '
Arthur was relied upon by the Michigan Supreme Court in another state court decision that stands out because of the analysis
exhibited. In People v. Jondreau,0 5 the court held that the State
of Michigan was prohibited from licensing or regulating a Chippewa
Indian of the L'Anse reservation who was charged with fishing
outside of the reservation in adjoining Keweenaw Bay. The bay
261 P.2d at 140.
97. Id. -,
98. Id. -,
261 P.2d at 142.
99. From the minutes of the treaty council the court pointed to the following as an
"interesting statement" of intent:
I shall do you no wrong and you do me none, both our rights shall be protected forever; it is not for ourselves here that we are talking, it Is for those
that come that we are speaking.
Id. -,
261 P.2d at 141.
100. Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 244 (1896). Nonetheless, since the Supreme Court's
departure from Race Horse has been sub silentio, the decision is technically not overruled.
101. 74 Idaho -,
261 P.2d at 137-38.
102. Id. -,
261 P.2d at 139.
108. Id.
104. Id.
105. 884 Mich. 539, 185 N.W.2d 375 (1971).
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was situated within land originally ceded to the United States by
the Chippewas, by an 1854 treaty. Article II of the treaty provides:
and such of them as reside in the territory hereby ceded,
shall have the right to hunt and fish therein, until otherwise
ordered by the President. 08
...

The court turned to the famous decision of Worcester v.
Georgia'0 7 to obtain the rule of treaty construction as follows: "how
the words of the treaty were understood by this unlettered people,
rather than their critical meaning, should form the rule of construction."' 108 With this caveat, the court declared:
The substance of the right to fish must have included the right
to fish on the Keweenaw Bay. For the L'Anse Band . . . the
fishing right on the Keweenaw Bay was clearly a valuable
right. Any other construction of the treaty would make the
right granted by the treaty without substance. The Indians
did not have the knowledge of the laws concerning municipal
boundaries or sovereignty disputes between the Federal and
State governments. Since they were living on land bordering
the Keweenaw Bay, as "an unlettered people" they would
assume that the right to fish meant the right to fish on the
Keweenaw Bay. 0 9
Relying on Arthur and solid constitutional law, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution prevents the state from licensing or regulating
the treaty right in the absence of Congressional or Presidential
delegation of power." 0
In State v. Tinno,"1 the Idaho Supreme Court retreated and
12
cowed to the Supreme Court's adoption of the Tulee-Winans dictum
that permitted state regulation for conservation. The decision, while
in the main well-analyzed, says that Idaho may regulate this fishing
right if the State meets certain strict standards." 3 The principal
holding, however, is grounded on the "reserved rights" doctrine
developed in Tulee" 4 and Winans"5 together with the minutes from
the Shoshone-Bannock treaty negotiations." 0 The brazen court declared that in the original contemplation of the Indians, the treaty
106.
107.
108.
109.

10 Stat. 1109 (1854).
31 U.S. (6 Peters) 515, 582 (1832).
384 Mich. at 544, 185 N.W.2d at 377.
Id. at -,
185 N.W.2d at 378.
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Id.

111. State v. Tinno, 94 Idaho 759, 497 P.2d 1386 (1972).
112. See text accompanying note 49, supra.
113. State v. Tinno, 94 Idaho 759, 497 P.2d,1386 (1972).
114. 315 U.S. 681
115. 198 U.S. 371

(1942).
(1905).

116. 15 Stat. 673 (1869). This is the same treaty misconstrued by Justice White in Ward
v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 244 (1896).
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right to hunt included the right to fish upon unoccupied federal
lands. 1 17 This was so, the court asserted, even though this area
was never part of their reservation.""'
It seems critically clear after reviewing these few state decisions
that the United States Supreme Court is not giving the hunting
and fishing rights questions the analysis required. After Tinno one
cannot assume that salvation lies in state courts when the Idaho
Supreme Court concedes the most important unanalyzed issue, 1 9
that is, whether the states have any power to regulate fishing rights.
Perhaps, in the future the Arthur-McConville reasoning, analysis
which rejects unreasoned assumption that states may regulate treaty
rights for conservation, will be resurrected. Until then, what began
as a dictum in Winans"20 will continue to plague those who expect
reason and analysis in the law.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION FOR NON-INDIANS:
ENFORCEMENT DISCRIMINATE?

DOES TREATY

In other words, the treaty was not a grant of rights to the
Indians, but a grant
of rights from them - a reservation of
12
those not granted. '
A.

SPECIAL STATUS FOR NATIVE AMERICANS

For the Indians hunting and fishing are not merely a form
of recreation. Since most reservations are impoverished,
these activities are necessary for their very livelihood. Time
and time again sportsmen and conservationists restricted
the Indians
in the pursuit of their very means of subsis1 22
tence.
Indians possess special status" 23 by virtue of their treaty rights
along with their traditional relationship vis-a-vis the federal government.124 In United States v. Winans,"25 the Supreme Court declared
that notwithstanding the phrase "in common with citizens of the
territory," treaty language conferred upon the Yakimas continuing
rights, beyond those which other citizens may enjoy, to fish at
their usual and accustomed places outside their reservation.126 The
117. State v. Tinno, 94 Idaho 759, -,
497 P.2d 1386, 1390-91 (1972).
118. Id.
119. See Johnson, The States Versus Indian Off-Reservation Fishing: A United States Supreme Court Error,47 WASH. L. REv. 207, 222 (1972).
120. See text accompanying supra note 49.
121. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905).
122.

W. MEYER, NATiVE AMERICANS 67 (1972).

123. For an exposition of why Indians are special citizens see E. ScHUsKY, THE RIGHT TO
BE INDIAN 17-25 (1971).
124. For a summation of this relationship see Bean, The Limits of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Cornucopiaof Inherent Powers, 49 N.D. L. Rgv. 303, 304-311 (1973).
125. 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905).
126. This reasoning was cited with approval in Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 684, 685
(1942) ; also citing Seufert Brothers Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1918).
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principal reason for affording Indians special status based upon
treaty rights was cogently explained by Justice Marshall as follows:
The Indians Nations did not seek out the United States and
agree upon an exchange of lands in an arm's-length transaction. Rather, treaties were imposed upon them and they
had no choice but to consent. 27
Special rights to a limited class are not ipso facto violative
of the law. Both the federal government and the states have traditionally extended special benefits to farmers, indigents, veterans,
handicapped and older persons. 2 8 The special treatment accordingto-law argument is buttressed by the moral argument which asserts
that since our white society has taken the land and culture from
the Indian, it is only fair that each victim of his wrong be compensated. This repayment-of-debt theory appeals to our morality since
Indians hunted and fished prior to the coming of the white man.
B.

EQUAL PROTECTION FOR NON-INDIANS

The issue has been clouded by the claims of conservationists
that hunting has to be regulated to protect the species. This
argument applies only to the annual slaughter by white men
seeking "trophy" animals who often leave killed animals to
rot while seeking other, larger specimens to hang on their
walls as proof of their "masculinity." Indians do not slaughter deer, nor do they waste meat. Though in general Indians
are no longer as conservation-minded as they were once,
they hardly pose a threat to the species with their minimal
hunting practices.'2
The question of equal protection for non-Indians drums softly
beneath decisions which have recognized Indian treaty game rights. 180
In newspaper articles'-- and judicial dicta 82 from state court decisions the equal protection issue has been belabored. Recently,
the question surfaced again in a dissenting state court opinion.
The associate judge stated as follows:
The Treaty of Medicine Creek . . . cannot be sensibly interpreted, I think, so as to award the descendants of these prim127.

Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1970).

128. See Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1181-82 (1967)
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964).
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(1972).
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131. See, e.g., The Brainerd (Minn.) Daily Dispatch, Jan. 21, 1972, at 1, col. 1-7.
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itive people rights and privileges today in the state's waters
not enjoyed in common by all of their fellow citizens of the
state and the United States. The court's ruling, I fear, not
only deprives citizens of the equal protection of the laws, but
grants to some Indians as a class immunities and privileges
not enjoyed by all citizens, including most
all in
133 Indians violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Since treaties and agreementsTM are negotiated, entered into,
and ratified, by the federal government, often prior to the statehood
of the states which now encompass the reservations, Justice Hale
obviously errs when he contends that any treaty enforcement violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The amendment only proscribes
"state action." 135 Reliance might properly have been placed on the
Fifth Amendment, however. The Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause has been judicially expanded to secure for individuals equality
against discriminatory federal classifications.3 6
The argument must submit that the legislative, executive, and
judicial guarantees of benefits or rights for certain Native Americans create a discriminatory classification. The Supreme Court has
looked to the purpose of such classifications, to determine constitutionality. In Shapiro v. Thompson, a state welfare regulation
that required one year of residence for eligibility was found to
be violative of the Fifth Amendment. There the purpose was deterring the immigration of indigents to the state. Unlike Shapiro, however, the purpose of honoring treaties and agreements is not constitutionally impermissible. Moreover, it is perverse to argue that
equal protection of the laws under the Fifth Amendment sanctions
violations of other laws such as treaties.
III.

SUGGESTIONS FOR JUDICIAL BALANCING
[N]either the United States Supreme Court nor any federal
court has ever faced squarely, or analyzed carefully, the
most critical issue in the conflict; that is, whether the states

133. Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 80 Wash. 2d 561, -,
497 P.2d 171,
182 (1972) (Hale, J., dissenting).
134. Since the Indian Appropriation Act of March 9, 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566, R.S. § 2079,
presently codified as 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1970), the United States no longer makes treaties
with Indian nations or tribes. The act transformed the form of negotiations from treaties
to "agreements." See F. CoisN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERA.L INDiAN LAW 67 (1941).
135. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, inter alia: "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privilege or immunities of citizens of the United States....
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
136. See, e.g., Shapiro v Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) ; Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500 (1961) ; Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 585 (1937) ; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921). But see Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943);
I-elvering v. Lerner Stores Corp., 314 U.S. 463, 468 (1941) ; Sunshine Authractte Coal Co.
v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 401 (1940)
La Belle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377,
392 (1921).
137. 394 U.S. 618 (1960).
138. Johnson, The States Versus Indian Off-Reservation Fishing: A United States Supreme
Court Error, 47 WASH. L. REv. 207, 232 (1972).
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have any power whatsoever to regulate Indian fishing rights.
Second, the standards pronounced to date by the federal and
rights
state courts to guide state regulation of Indian fishing
138
are woefully confused, uncertain, and inadequate.
A.

OVERDUE EXAMINATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO REG-

ULATE TREATY RIGHTS

The meaning of the Constitution does not change with the
ebb and flow of economic events. We frequently are told in
more general words that the Constitution must be construed
in the light of the present. If by that it is meant that the
Constitution is made of living words that apply to every new
condition which they include, the statement is quite true. But
to say, if that be intended, that the words of the Constitution
mean today what they did not mean when written - that is,
that they do not apply to a situation now to which they would
have applied then - is to rob that instrument of the essential
element which continues it in force as the people have made
it until they, and not their official agents, have made it otherwise.13 9
The above analysis of the cases underscores the need for uniform
measuring rods in Native American game disputes. The first step
must be to carefully consider whether the states have power to
regulate Indian off-reservation hunting and fishing. This power can1 40
not be assumed any longer.
It is submitted that it would take a substantial gloss on the
Supremacy Clause to find that the Tenth Amendment reserves such
power to states. The language of the Supremacy Clause is unequivocal; the "[c]onstitution . . . and all treaties made . . . shall
be the supreme Law of the Land." '1 4 ' The Tenth Amendment merely
reserves "Powers not delegated . . . nor prohibited . . . to the
States." Equally unavailing is Article One's reference to Congressional power "[t]o regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian
Tribes."1 4 2 Considerable effort is needed to find constitutional underpinnings to support state regulation of Native American treaty game
rights in the name of conservation. Courts must exhibit the intellectual integrity of facing this basic constitutional question if they
are to command respect. Next, courts should focus upon the treaty
language and history available to establish intent of the parties.
139.
140.
141.
142.

West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 402-03 (1937).
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B.

INTENT OF TREATY SIGNATORIES

The time has come at long last for the courts to brush away
the fog, fantasy, folklore and mythology upon which I perceive these Indian treaty decisions appear to rest and to read
intended by both the Indian and the
the treaties as they were
143
government to be read.

In Tulee v. Washington,'" the Supreme Court emphasized Indian
intent reflected in records made during negotiations as follows:
[f]rom the report set out in the record before us of the proceedings in the long council at which the treaty agreement
was reached, we are impressed by the strong desire the Indians had to retain the right to hunt and fish in accordance
with the immemorial customs of their tribes. It is our responsibility to see that the terms of the treaty are carried out,
so far as possible, in accordance with the meaning they were
understood to have by the tribal representatives at the council
and in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obliganation to protect the interests of a dependent
tion of1 4 this
5
people.

47
46
Tulee stands with United States v. Winans,' State v. Arthur,1
49
14
People v. Jondreau, and State v. Tinno' as pinnacles of judicial
respect for the intent of the signers of treaties. Indian intent can
be gathered from the testimony and records of tribal elders. This
intent also may be gleaned from treaty minutes as in State v.
Arthur. Another source is the legislative history including committee
hearings and floor speeches preceding ratification of respective
treaties. This indicium of intent is preserved in the Congressional
Record. This historical research should reveal any subsequent legislation or agreements which purport to divest hunting or fishing
rights. If such action is found, it must be weighed against Menominee
Tribe v. United States. 50 The Court must test the validity of the
legislative attempt to sever the rights with Indian intent, adequacy
5
of consideration, and the effect on the tribal economy.' ' In no
event should an effort be made to equate the importance of the
game rights to Indians with the method or frequency of exercise
of game, feathers,
because the ceremonial hunting and religious use
5 2

and fur differ from that of Anglo sportsmen.
143.
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C.

A FAIR SHARE FOR TREATY HOLDERS
Recently, Indians have argued strongly for their exclusion from state game rules. On the reservation Indians feel
they are not bound by state hunting or fishing regulations.
Only rarely is game of any importance in reservation econmies. Recent protests have clearly been demonstrations to
show the possession of special rights; the hunting or fishing
in themselves were unimportant.' 3

The Supreme Court left lower courts with the "reasonable and
necessary" test to utilize in reviewing state conservation programs.
Lower courts are without guidance as to the meaning of "necessity."
It is submitted that "necessity" must incorporate a factor that
ensures fair share of harvestable game to the holders of treaty
rights.1 4 One federal district court enunciated such a test. In Sohappy
v. Smith' 55 the court declared that a state regulation which does
not insure that a "fair share" of the harvestable fish actually escapes the lower river, non-Indian fishermen would violate the Indian
treaty right to fish.1 56 The court omitted consideration of how to
implement the test. Nonetheless, a fair share to treaty holders is
an excellent yardstick by which to measure state wildlife programs.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Indian hunting and fishing questions today reduce to contests
among sportsmen, states, and Native Americans. It is a competition
for a limited resource. It results in states eroding federal guarantees
to the Native Americans in the name of conservation. Conservation
seems to be defined as that program which satisfies the greatest
number of sportsmen.
The foregoing exploration analyzed the case law and offered
modest suggestions for development of a reasoned judicial posture
for future off-reservation game controversies. Judicial abnegation
is revealed in the failure to carefully reason where states get the
power to regulate treaty rights. This cannot continue if there is
to be an end to the continual litigation of the off-reservation questions.
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